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A BETTER BARGAIN IN FILENE'S BASEMENT:
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR ABEL
PETER C. BUCK*
In Practicing Immigration Law in Filene's Basement,' Professor
Richard Abel directs his formidable skills in mining and interpreting
data toward the significant and related problems of lawyer neglect
and incompetence. He chooses the "extreme case"2 of Joe Muto, a
hapless immigration lawyer in New York City, to illustrate the
severity of the legal profession's problems in this regard. Using Muto
as an example, he proposes empirical work to identify the behavioral
variables that characterize neglectful or incompetent lawyers and
offers some tentative ideas on potential remedies.
Professor Abel's visit to one of the law's bargain basements
yields a thought-provoking and troubling look into a practice gone
completely wrong. His detailed picture of life on the front lines of
New York City's Immigration Court practice highlights a problem
that deserves a careful response from the legal profession. More
importantly, the data he has assembled and his suggestions of possible
cures guide our attention to the much more widespread problems of
lawyer neglect and incompetence. This Response seeks to address
both the specific and the general issues, though the concerns will
frequently overlap. Before going on, though, it is necessary to deal
initially with two preliminary matters.
First, Joe Muto may present too extreme a case to serve as the
best illustration of the problems that concern Professor Abel. For
thirty-five pages, we learn of troubling fact after troubling fact culled
from the more than 1,200 transcript pages from Muto's hearing
before the Departmental Disciplinary Committee of the New York
Supreme Court Appellate Division.3 Muto is a terrible lawyer, a Joe
* Mr. Buck is a shareholder with the firm of Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A. in
Charlotte, N.C. where he practices in the areas of mergers and acquisitions, corporate law,
banking and finance, and energy law.
1. Richard L. Abel, Practicing Immigration Law in Filene's Basement, 84 N.C. L.
REV. 1449 (2006).
2. Id. at 1488.
3. Id. at 1452 n.18.
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Btfsplk4 of the bar. Again and again, and despite his loud and pained
protests, we see him make little or no effort to organize and control
his practice, completely ignore the best interests of his clients (with
whom he generally is unable to communicate), and show an almost
pathological inability to provide competent representation. Muto,
though, presents issues that very likely are unique to him. At least a
part of his problems may be "characterological," 5 and thus a function
of singular personal circumstances. As the referee in Muto's
disciplinary hearing found, "some deeper psychological cause"6 may
be the best explanation of this sorry picture. One wonders, in the
face of this nearly interminable list of malfeasances, whether there is
anything that can be done.
Second, the community in which lawyer Muto practiced presents
unique issues that may limit the usefulness of the market-based and
regulatory remedies that Professor Abel suggests as tentative
solutions to the general problem of lawyer neglect. The bar at 26
Federal Plaza serves an "unusually vulnerable"7 clientele, who more
than any other group of clients are completely dependent on
intermediaries. Muto's clients primarily were Chinese immigrants,
either here illegally or seeking asylum, unable to speak English,
generally poor and deep in debt to unscrupulous middlemen, and
facing the threat of deportation.8 For most such clients,9 the inability
to pay anything like a reasonable fee makes a market-based solution
4. Joe Btfsplk was one of the central characters of the Lil' Abner comic strip, drawn
by Al Capp and syndicated from 1934 through 1977 throughout the United States. Lil'
Abner, About Lil' Abner (2005), http://www.lil-abner.com/abnerbio.html. His was the
forlorn character who jinxed all around him and whose every move was shadowed by a
dark cloud immediately over his head. Lil' Abner, Other Characters (2005), http://www.lil-
abner.com/other.html. The pronunciation of his last name is said to resemble a Bronx
cheer. Btfsplk (Aug. 28,2005), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Btfsplk.
5. Abel, supra note 1, at 1489.
6. Id. at 1474.
7. Id. at 1488. The intermediaries who frequently charge exorbitant fees in return
for help to Chinese people who seek to immigrate are often referred to as "snakeheads."
Id. at 106. For a description of an allegedly very abusive "snakehead," see Julia Preston,
Ringleader Gets 35- Year Term in Smuggling of Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2006, at
BI (reporting that a "snakehead" was sentenced to thirty-five years in prison for "running
one of New York City's most lucrative immigrant smuggling rings").
8. See Abel, supra note 1, at 1453-54.
9. This is not true for all immigration clients. Ann Hsiung, who appears to be a
competent immigration law practitioner, charged and received $3,500 to $5,000 for asylum
representations and provided service that reflected the price paid. Id. at 1463-64. In
contrast, the evidence shows that Muto found a large market for his bargain-basement
approach. He generally charged only $150 for similar representations, id. at 1453, and thus
chronically accepted case loads far beyond his capacity, as many as 500 at a time. Id. at
1464.
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to the problems examined here a virtual impossibility. Likewise, the
status of illegal alien that burdened most of Muto's clients renders it
unlikely that they would benefit from a regulatory solution, either
through the courts or in a disciplinary forum.1" The immigrant plight
thus cries out for a government solution, probably in the form of
salaried lawyers similar to those on public defender staffs but possibly
through some combination of pro bono and contracted services.
While this solution seems obvious, the "community" of illegal aliens
may find little political support to help it resolve the problem of poor
legal representation."' In the specific context in which Joe Muto
10. It is true, as Professor Abel notes, that the availability in immigration cases of
resort to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel may in some situations increase the
likelihood that immigration clients would seek redress in court. See In re Lozada, 19 I. &
N. Dec. 637, 637 (1988), available at 1988 BIA LEXIS 19. Indeed, some of Muto's clients
apparently moved to reopen their cases by arguing that he had failed to represent them
properly. See Abel, supra note 1, at 1454. Yet the availability of ineffective-assistance
claims seems to have had little impact in Muto's case, and the factors noted in the text
make it unlikely that such claims will lead immigration clients to seek other remedies
against the offending lawyers.
11. Professor Abel has documented the erosion of governmental support for legal aid
in criminal law and other contexts in the United Kingdom. RICHARD L. ABEL, ENGLISH
LAWYERS BETWEEN MARKET AND STATE: THE POLITICS OF PROFESSIONALISM 240-
353 (2003). In the United States, federal funding for the Legal Services Corporation,
which provides legal services for civil matters involving low-income people, peaked in
inflation-adjusted dollars in 1981; current funding represents less than half the 1981 level.
LEGAL SERVICES CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE
CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 18 n.22 (2005),
available at http://www.lsc.gov/press/documents/LSC%20Justice%2OGapFINAL_1001.
pdf. In the area of indigent criminal defense, the authors of a report in March 2000 of the
National Symposium on Indigent Defense, convened by the United States Department of
Justice, summarized a bleak situation:
Overall ... indigent defense in the United States today is in a chronic state of
crisis. Standards are frequently not implemented, contracts are often awarded to
the lowest bidder without regard to the scope or quality of services, organizational
structures are weak, workloads are high, and funding has not kept pace with other
components of the criminal justice system. The effects can be severe, including'
legal representation of such low quality to amount to no representation at all ....
OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. IMPROVING CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS
THROUGH EXPANDED STRATEGIES AND INNOVATIVE COLLABORATIONS: REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON INDIGENT DEFENSE, at ix (2000), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/indigentdefense/icjs.pdf. Much of the opposition to Legal Aid is
grounded in the perception that Legal Aid lawyers often use their clients to further their
own social agendas, as opposed to working in individual cases to help poor citizens. See,
e.g., Illegal Immigration Amnesty Bills Would Be a Boon for Taxpayer-Funded Legal
Services Lawyers, LEGAL SERVICES MONITOR, Jan. 1, 2005, at 1, http://www.nlpc.org/
view.asp?action=viewArticle&aid=745 (stating that Legal Services Corp. has a history of
filing Legal Aid lawsuits to "advance liberal political causes"). See generally DAVID
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988) (addressing, in chapters 13
through 16, how public interest lawyers practice politics and not just the law. Luban
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
worked, then, we confront a problem that may have little likelihood
of being resolved.
Enough, though, of clearing these bits of underbrush. Professor
Abel set out to shed some light on a big problem in the legal
profession and, notwithstanding these limitations of his illustration,
the details of Joe Muto's story serve his purpose well. Unlike Captain
Renault, we at the bar can hardly protest that we are "shocked" that
Muto's kind of lawyering could actually be going on.'" Resignation to
defeat because of the sui generis characteristics of Muto personally
and the New York City immigration practice will not help us find
solutions to a problem that Professor Abel shows us is pervasive in
most professions, 3 and quite possibly worst of all for lawyers. 4 Table
1 included within the Article confirms what we know anecdotally:
clients believe lawyers all too often pay little or no attention to their
cases and, even when they do, lack the competence to deliver the
services that people expect. 5 The problem is widespread and it seems
to be worse for solo practitioners and lawyers in very small firms,16
although this may be as much the result of the relative powerlessness
of the client populations involved than of the practices' organizational
structure.
Professor Abel argues convincingly that we need to do a lot more
study if we are to make any headway in reducing lawyer neglect and
incompetence. 7 But he does offer some provisional remedies for
examination,18 and a closer look at his tentative solutions repays the
effort. There are four, to each of which I have taken the liberty of
applying a short-hand label:
(1) the "traditional professional" approach: placing limits on
solo practitioners, effectively requiring apprenticeship, and
argues that "practicing politics on behalf of have-nots is a legitimate and worthy form of
practicing law, even when legal aid lawyers engaging in it are publicly funded.").
Recently, law school clinics have received similar criticism. Heather MacDonald,
Editorial, Clinical, Cynical, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2006, at A14. The Legal Services
Corporation is authorized to provide certain discrete services to immigrants, including in
applications for asylum. See Alien Status and Eligibility, 45 C.F.R. § 1626.5 (2005).
12. See CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. 1942), http://www.casalinx.com/casecrewrains.
htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2006) (Captain of Police Louis Renault, played by Claude
Rains).
13. Abel, supra note 1, at 1449-50.
14. Id. at 1449-51.
15. See id. at 1495-96 tbl.1 & 1498 tbl.2.
16. See id. at 1489-90.
17. Id. at 1494.
18. Id. at 1490-93.
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requiring specialized training and certification;19
(2) the "pure market" approach: allowing the market for legal
services to correct its own imperfections; 2°
(3) the "enhanced market" approach: making the market more
effective by opening the field to law students, required pro
bono legal services, and representation by non-lawyers;2' and
(4) the "regulatory" approach: beefing up lawyer disciplinary
measures or finding ways to allow malpractice claims and
malpractice insurance markets to create greater disincentives.22
Each of these remedies holds promise for the general problem of
neglect in legal practice. As the Article points out, however, there
are problems with each, especially in the context of 26 Federal
Plaza.23  Practice restrictions, as proposed in the "traditional
professional" approach, will meet fierce resistance from the many
solo private practitioners in the United States, as will the addition of
specialization requirements. And Professor Abel would share their
reservations, albeit for a very different reason: he has long distrusted
lawyers' invocation of professionalism as a means of helping clients,
seeing in most such appeals an economically-motivated grab for self-
protection. 24  Although this author would protest that pride in the
profession and concern for client welfare, driven perhaps by
reputational concerns, furnish less objectionable grounds for some
19. Id. at 1491.
20. Id. at 1491-92.
21. Id. at 1492-93.
22. Id. at 1493-94.
23. Id. at 1494.
24. Professor Abel has described lawyers' efforts to control the "production of
producers" by creating, through law school admission standards, bar examination and
licensing requirements, various controls over how many and who become lawyers. See,
e.g., RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 96-119 (1989) (describing how American
lawyers have protected their profession from competition since its inception and have
erected barriers to entry); ABEL, supra note 11, at 159-201 (describing how the British law
profession has controlled who becomes a lawyer, and competition from inside and outside
the profession). He has also reviewed the profession's efforts to limit "production ... by
producers," thus controlling competition through various direct means such as restrictions
on the unauthorized practice of law and lay competitors (e.g., in conveyancing of real
property), limitations on multidisciplinary firms, and specialization requirements. See,
e.g., ABEL, supra, at 158-65 (examining strategy of demand creation by which American
lawyers have controlled "the production of producers and by producers of legal services"
(alteration in original)); ABEL, supra note 11, at 202-39 (describing how English lawyers
controlled competition within the practice of law).
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such proposals, he is far from alone in this view. Regulators, among
others, have shared the professor's suspicion in recent years.' For
example, the Australian Professional Standards Board for Patent and
Trade Marks Attorneys recommended the creation of a two-tiered
registration process for lawyers seeking to practice in these complex
areas.2 6 The proposal would have effectively required a two-year
apprenticeship with an experienced patent or trade mark attorney.27
In presenting the recommendation, the chairman of the Standards
Board had only the interests of his clients at heart:
[T]here were strong concerns expressed by a number of interest
areas that at the time of registration, and for several years
thereafter, there is a shortfall in the practical knowledge
required by attorneys to practise without supervision. This was
expressed not just by experienced practitioners, but also by
persons who have recently qualified as well as students. In
other words there was a strong, though not unanimous, view
that at the time of registration persons are now better educated
in the law and some aspects of practice that relies on legal
theory, but they are less skilled in the practical application of
the law for the benefit of their clients. Thus there is a greater
risk to those persons, and their clients, were they to practise
following registration in a sole practice or in an unsupervised
environment.28
The responsible government agency demurred: "The
introduction of a two stage registration system for both professions
would: not be in line with the Government's general policy of
reducing restrictions in professions ....9
At least in Professor Abel's illustration, then, increased
25. E.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 773, 785, 793 (1975) (holding bar-imposed
minimum fee schedules constitute price-fixing in violation of antitrust laws).
26. PROF'L STANDARDS BOARD FOR PATENT AND TRADE MARKS ATrORNEYS,
REVIEW OF THE REGULATORY REGIME FOR PATENT AND TRADE MARKS ATrORNEYS
(2004), available at http://www.psb.gov/au/pdfs/Professional%Standards%20Report
%20Text.pdf.
27. Id.
28. Letter from Raoul Mortley AO, Chair, to The Honorable Warren Entsch MP,
Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Industry Tourism and Resources (May 12,
2004), in REVIEW OF THE REGULATORY REGIME FOR PATENT AND TRADE MARKS
AT-rORNEYS, supra note 26.
29. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS BOARD FOR
PATENT AND TRADE MARKS ATTORNEYS' (PSB) REVIEW OF THE REGULATORY
REGIME FOR PATENT AND TRADE MARKS ATTORNEYS 1, available at
http://www.psb.gov.au/pdfs/Govt %20Response %20to%20PSB%20Review%20of%2OReg
ulatory%20Regime.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2006).
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specialization requirements to improve legal expertise do not seem to
be the answer. Muto's complete absence of organization skills and an
unwillingness, likely grounded in his economic self-interest, to limit
his caseload play a much more important role in any event. Muto
graduated from an accredited law school and apparently passed the
bar examination in New York," and his problems only occasionally
stemmed from lack of substantive knowledge.31
Likewise, allowing the "pure market" to work its magic does not
seem a good answer for the Chinese immigrants whom Joe Muto
represented. Their situation places in sharp relief the raison d'etre of
professions, the great asymmetries in information that make it
difficult if not impossible for consumers of services to differentiate as
to quality.32 These clients generally could speak no English,33 much
less make any sort of determination before the fact regarding the
competence or dedication of the lawyers who might be available to
help them. Moreover, their desperate lack of funds means that they
would choose price, especially Muto's unrealistic $150 fixed fees,3'
over quality in virtually every situation. Thus, while, there is no
doubt that harnessing of market incentives can at least improve the
cost-effectiveness of delivery of certain types of services,35 and such
mechanisms may hold significant promise for improving the quality of
services at least in some types of practice, traditional market remedies
may not provide effective solutions for "personal plight"36 clients such
as immigrants, tenants resisting eviction, parents engaged in child
custody disputes, and bankrupt individuals and small businesses.
30. Abel, supra note 1, at 1488.
31. Rationalizing problems in his early career in Syracuse, Muto admitted that he
"didn't know how to do a matrimonial" matter, although he had gladly taken on such an
assignment. Id. at 1471. Solo and small-firm practitioners report that they use various
means to stay current in their areas of practice, including bar association written materials
and continuing legal education conferences, online resources, and advice from colleagues.
However, the cost and time commitment required to "stay up on the law" can place
especially severe burdens on the small law office. Leslie C. Levin, The Ethical World of
Solo and Small Law Firm Practitioners, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 309,332-35 (2004).
32. See Abel, supra note 1, at 1451.
33. See id. at 1474.
34. Id. at 1453.
35. See, e.g., Zachary J. Bossenbroek & Puneet Mohey, Should Your Legal
Department Join the India Outsourcing Craze?, ACC DOCKET, Oct. 2004, at 46, 46-54
(describing how outsourcing document review to an Indian firm can save law firms sixty to
seventy percent in wages); Jonathan D. Glater, Even Law Firms Join the Trend to
Outsourcing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2006, at C7 (reporting on a growing trend of law firms
hiring outside providers to conduct legal research).
36. JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL
STRUcTURE OF THE BAR 71 n.11 (1982).
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Professor Abel's third provisional remedy, an "enhanced
market" approach, may hold more promise in the immigration
context and perhaps in other personal plight circumstances as well.
He considers several alternatives to promote greater client choice:
opening up immigration proceedings to representation by law
students and non-lawyers who work for nonprofit agencies; improving
access to pro bono legal services; and even allowing the "travel
agencies"37 that caused so many problems in their roles as
intermediaries and other for-profit organizations to take on the
representations.38 Reliance on non-lawyers, in particular those in for-
profit roles, raises interesting questions under the Rules of
Professional Conduct and other regimes that normally would govern
the lawyer-client relationship. For example, would communications
to and from such non-lawyer representatives be afforded the
protection of the attorney-client privilege?39 Professor Abel notes
that opening the courts to such persons would require at least some of
the same sorts of regulation that apply to lawyers.' Greater
availability of pro bono services would, as noted above,41 appear the
best solution for the unhappy clients at 26 Federal Plaza. Yet, as the
Article makes clear, it is unlikely that pro bono services from any
source can begin to meet the great need for legal representation of
immigrants who cannot afford to pay.42
Finally, there is "regulation." New York did in fact disbar Joe
Muto,4 3 but only after he had "practiced," apparently in the same
haphazard fashion, for fifteen years. Lawyer disciplinary bodies find
it difficult to act except on the basis of a repeated pattern of neglect,
37. Abel, supra note 1, at 1453.
38. Id. at 1491-92.
39. The privilege frequently is denied to non-lawyers, even when they are playing the
role of an advocate that would seem to call forth the same policy concerns present when
lawyers act in such a capacity. For example, in Nemecek v. Board of Governors of the
University of North Carolina, the court held that communications with a "lay
representative" of a professor in a hearing to resolve a university tenure dispute were not
protected by the privilege because the representative, another professor, was not a lawyer.
Nemecek v. Bd. Of Governors of the Univ. of N.C., No. 98CV00062, 2000 WL 33672978,
at *1 (E.D. N.C. Sept. 27, 2000); see Janet J. Higley, Robert C. Jones, Jr. & Peter C. Buck,
Confidentiality of Communications by In-House Counsel for Financial Institutions, 6 N.C.
BANKING INST. 265,281-82 (2002).
40. Abel, supra note 1, at 1492-93.
41. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
42. Abel, supra note 1, at 1492; see supra note 11 and accompanying text. The legal
profession's support for pro bono services in general can hardly be characterized as
energetic. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE
LEGAL PROFESSION 37-38 (2000).
43. Abel, supra note 1, at 1477.
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thus, as here, permitting a "great deal of damage" to precede an
appropriate corrective." As Professor Abel notes, small-firm and
solo practitioners frequently view the whole legal disciplinary
structure generally as an illegitimate project created by lawyers in
large firms and elite practices to enhance their own reputations and
erect barriers to competition.45 It would be unfortunate if the battle
lines over lawyer discipline pit large firm lawyers against small firms
and solo practitioners. The special pressures of representing
individuals in personal plight circumstances, where solo and small-
firm practices provide much of the lawyering, may account for many
of the issues addressed by lawyer disciplinary regimes, as opposed to
structural or organizational differences between small and large
firms.
4 6
But aside from the divergence of perspectives on the regulatory
solution, there can be little dispute that the legal profession, which
historically has insisted that its unique knowledge and expertise47 and
the need to maintain the profession's independence from government
domination' justify self-regulation, has done a poor job of
disciplining its own.49 As in Muto's case, other lawyers rarely initiate
44. Id. at 1493.
45. Id. at 1493-94.
46. Personal plight clients can be especially hard to deal with because of the very
difficulties in which they find themselves. Although this is likely not the case with many
immigration clients, see supra text accompanying note 10, personal plight clients in many
circumstances may be more likely than corporate and business clients to seek disciplinary
action against their lawyers, perhaps because their lack of financial resources leaves them
without other avenues of redress. Moreover, these clients are more likely to have a very
significant emotional investment in the matters in which they are represented and thus feel
more acutely the pain of a bad outcome. Levin, supra note 31, at 314. In addition, clients
in these circumstances are more apt to pressure their lawyers to engage in unethical
actions. Id. at 337-40. Of course, as with Muto, the need to maintain a large volume of
the often low-paying matters, as well as problems related to the management of a small
office, such as keeping up with filing, can also have a significant effect. See id. at 340-46.
47. ABEL, supra note 11, at 354.
48. The Preamble to the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional
Conduct states:
To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional calling, the
occasion for government regulation is obviated. Self-regulation also helps maintain
the legal profession's independence from government domination. An
independent legal profession is an important force in preserving government
under law, for abuse of legal authority is more readily challenged by a profession
whose members are not dependent on government for the right to practice.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 11 (2005).
49. Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should
Control Lawyer Regulation-Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167,
1169-70 (2003); Michael S. Frisch, No Stone Left Unturned: The Failure of Attorney Self-
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disciplinary complaints against incompetent practitioners," and
judges, who may be best situated to observe such misconduct, also
exhibit reluctance to pursue disciplinary action.51  Even where
complaints are properly lodged, the current disciplinary system tends
to move at a "snail-like pace"52 and often fails in holding lawyers
accountable for their misdeeds. 3 Still, as Professor Abel has shown,
clients'do complain to disciplinary bodies.' Thus, in contexts where
the recipients of legal services are not so vulnerable as the immigrants
who depended on Joe Muto, improvements in lawyer regulation-
such as more involvement by courts or independent tribunals55-may
provide at least a partial solution to the problems of lawyer neglect
and incompetence.
And so, stepping back from the pixels of Joe Muto's
incompetence in search of a better vantage point, we see with
Professor Abel that there is much more work to do. The problem is
real and apparently widespread in some practice areas-and
empirical research into the behavioral factors and the practice
circumstances that give rise to such failures should be a priority for
the legal profession. Professor Abel has put forth several provisional
remedies,56 but without a better understanding of the reasons for
lawyer neglect that may come from such empirical research, we are
unable to say which, if any, of these possible solutions will provide
meaningful help.
Joe Muto's own words may provide a clue to one area of
additional research that might expand Professor Abel's list of
tentative solutions. Repeatedly and mystifyingly, this bad lawyer told
us of the pride he took in his practice and in his status as a lawyer.
His work "fulfill[ed] a life long ambition" and gave him a thrill when
Regulation in the District of Columbia, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 325, 325-26 (2005); see
ABEL, supra note 24, at 142-50; ABEL, supra note 11, at 393-96; RHODE, supra note 42, at
158-65; William T. Gallagher, Ideologies of Professionalism and the Politics of Self-
Regulation in the California State Bar, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 485, 489-90 (1995).
50. Ann Hsiung, the immigration lawyer whose organized approach to practice
contrasted so sharply with Muto's, told the immigration judge: "I don't want Mr. Muto or
the other gentleman thinking that I personally filed against them ... as much as I don't
agree with ... their practice ... it's really not my business." Abel, supra note 1, at 1463.
51. In Muto's case, Judge Ferris may have been motivated as much by Muto's
"shocking" last-minute attempt to "get the case away" from her with a baseless change-of-
venue motion, id. at 1467, and the havoc that he wrought with court schedules, see id. at
1486, as with the need to protect innocent clients.
52. Frisch, supra note 49, at 362.
53. Gallagher, supra note 49, at 490.
54. Abel, supra note 1, at 1495-96 tbl.1.
55. See Frisch, supra note 49, at 363.
56. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
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"somebody would come in and say they saw my name on the board,
on the sign in front of my office ...... "5 He boasted of finishing at the
top of his law school class and achieving a "stellar" record as a
prosecutor; overall, he claimed, he was doing an "excellent job" for
his clients, working long hours; he proclaimed loudly and often that
he provided good legal services at prices the people who needed them
could afford.58 While he seemed incapable of taking responsibility for
his chronic sloppiness and the damage it caused, there seems no
reason on this record to doubt that he anchored a great deal of his
pride and self-esteem in his professional life. Gaining acceptance
from the "legal community" carried at least some importance, even
for Joe Muto.59 In his case, unfortunately, professional pride and
avoidance of the shame and embarrassment associated with exposure
of his neglect failed to modify Muto's disregard of his clients in any
meaningful way. The reasons are not clear and may be rooted in the
characterological issues that Professor Abel notes.6
Notwithstanding their complete lack of warrant, though, Muto's
claims at least call attention to the possibility that pride of
accomplishment and a need to avoid embarrassment in front of peers
can motivate lawyer behavior. A closer examination of these cultural
drivers, especially in the solo-practice and small-firm context, may
reward our efforts. This author's own most unscientific survey of
small-firm lawyers suggests that lawyers such as Muto who practice in
functioning "communities" of lawyers-lawyers who know and have
frequent contact with each other-tend to respond to the practice
norms that these communities create and by which they live.61 This
very anecdotal evidence reinforces the findings of recent studies and
suggests that further research into the building of effective legal
communities, or networks, may prove fruitful in addressing the
problems raised by Professor Abel.62
57. Abel, supra note 1, at 1484.
58. Id. at 1479.
59. See id. at 1472.
60. See id. at 1489.
61. In preparing for the panel presentation that gave rise to this Response, this author
interviewed two solo practitioners, one who had begun his career with a small but
established litigation firm and another who had been in-house general counsel for a
communications company; a young lawyer working in a small legal aid agency providing
services to children in the criminal courts; and a more senior lawyer working in a space-
sharing arrangement with several other lawyers. All responded that lawyers with whom
they dealt frequently provided advice and aid, and helped establish standards of
competence and ethical behavior that were enforced effectively through informal means.
62. Traditional market incentives, of course, may be at work in these legal
communities or networks as well. Referrals from other solo and small-firm lawyers can
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For example, Professor Leslie Levin recently surveyed forty-one
practitioners in New York City63 and found that "the ethical decision-
making of solo and small firm lawyers is influenced by their
communities of practice and especially their early practice
communities" much more than by formal bar rules.' And a more
comprehensive set of interviews with 163 divorce lawyers in Maine
and New Hampshire 61 confirmed that participation in local
"communities of practice" creates circumstances in which community
norms positively affect lawyer behavior.66 There is therefore growing
evidence that "soft factors" such as norms, attitudes, beliefs, and
values that tend to develop in small practice bars may meaningfully
influence the quality and character of law practice.67 This research
may prove extremely interesting when considered in the case of Joe
Muto. The question is why the community of immigration lawyers in
which he practiced failed to develop effective norms of practice and
ethical behavior that would have protected his clients from his
chronic malfeasance?'
The beneficial impact of small ad hoc groups-sometimes we call
them communities, sometimes networks, in other circumstances,
teams-is becoming more apparent through research such as
Professor Levin's and others. It manifests itself in larger firms as well,
where the close networks created in the form of temporary task
forces, or project teams, create incentives for cooperation and hard
improve volume. JAY G. FOONBERG, HOW TO START & BUILD A LAW PRACTICE 210-12
(5th ed. 2004). Reputation and referrals from lawyers are significant factors in business
development for lawyers in all practices. See, e.g., Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, "It's
Darwinism - Survival of the Fittest:" How Markets and Reputations Shape the Ways in
Which Plaintiffs' Lawyers Obtain Clients, 21 LAW & POL'Y 377, 385-88 (1999) (describing
the important role that lawyer referrals play in building a legal practice); Herbert M.
Kritzer & Jayanth K. Krishnan, Lawyers Seeking Clients, Clients Seeking Lawyers:
Sources of Contingency Fee Cases and Their Implications for Case Handling, 21 LAW &
POL'Y 347, 357-59 (1999) (same).
63. Levin, supra note 31, at 318.
64. Id.
65. LYNN MATHER ET AL., DIVORCE LAWYERS AT WORK: VARIETIES OF
PROFESSIONALISM IN PRACTICE 50 (2001).
66. Id. at 6.
67. See John M. Conley & Scott Baker, Fall from Grace or Business as Usual? A
Retrospective Look at Lawyers on Wall Street and Main Street, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY,
783,798 (2005).
68. It may be that Muto, by establishing his fees so far below any reasonable level,
separated himself completely from the effect of any market incentives. His low prices
generated more than enough business without any lawyer referrals and notwithstanding
his reputation among the lawyers and judges of the immigration bar. Alternatively,
Muto's unique characterological issues may effectively have immunized him from
pressures and incentives that would have worked with most lawyers.
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work and open channels for the provision of informal advice (not
expressly accounted for in compensation decisions) to other lawyers
within the firm.69
It may be difficult to determine how such cultural factors work in
communities of lawyers, and why they apparently did not work at all
at 26 Federal Plaza. And it may turn out, as Professor Abel could
respond, that all such talk of community norms and pride of close-
knit networks of lawyers is only a smokescreen to embellish lawyers'
reputations and make it more difficult for competitors to enter the
fray. Still, there can be no doubt that "shame and honor" have driven
behavior in communities since ancient times.7" This has not always
occurred in ways that we would find helpful, but learning more about
the functioning and interconnection of these soft "cultural" factors, as
well as market incentives within lawyer "communities,"71 may afford
us greater insight into a set of problems that has shown itself to be
very resistant to a solution. Professor Abel has amassed the data, and
in the case of lawyer Muto, the discomforting details, making it very
hard for the legal profession to escape the need to improve our
understanding of these problems and to seek ways to better safeguard
those who rely on our diligence and competence.
69. EMMANUEL LAZEGA, THE COLLEGIAL PHENOMENON: THE SOCIAL
MECHANISMS OF COOPERATION AMONG PEERS IN A CORPORATE LAW PARTNERSHIP
93-99 (2001); see also Richard L. Abel, Varieties of Social Discipline: Collective Action in a
Law Firm, 31 J. L. & SOC'Y 610,617 (2004) (commenting on Lazega's research).
70. See, e.g., JEROME NEYREY, HONOR AND SHAME IN THE GOSPEL OF MATTHEW
3-4 (1998) (examining "Matthew's Gospel in terms of honor and shame" and exploring
how people have structured their lives around these values); BERNARD WILLIAMS,
SHAME AND NECESSITY 219-23 (1993) (examining the emotional root of shame).
71. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
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